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This article examines the transformation of transpacific tourism between the United States and Japan from 1947 to 1977, focusing on the key role that Pan American World Airways, Northwest Orient Airlines, and Japan Airlines played in this development. In the late 1940s, travel was mostly by a small upper class leisure market cruising on ships. Linkages between the air carriers and other factors, including governmental policy, travel organizations, and changes in business and culture influenced the industry. By the 1970s, these elements had reshaped the nature and geography of tourism, into a mass airline tourist market characterized by package tours, special interest trips, and consumer values.

Between 1947 and 1977, several factors helped transform the nature of transpacific tourism between the United States and Japan. Pan American Airways, Northwest Airlines, and Japan Airlines played crucial roles in this development. These airline companies employed various marketing strategies, worked with travel associations, tapped into expanding consumer values, and pressured governments. Simultaneously, decisions made by tourist organizations, consumers, and especially governments also shaped this process. The evolution of transpacific tourism occurred in three stages, growing slowly from 1947 to 1954, accelerating in the period to 1964, and finally developing into a mass leisure market by the 1970s.¹

When the US State Department officially permitted Pan American Airways and Northwest Airlines to start offering regularly scheduled service to Japan in August 1947, few American tourists wanted to make the journey. This was largely because they would have had to obtain a passport from the State Department and a certificate from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Tourists would also be obligated to convince the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) in the Pacific, General Douglas MacArthur, that their presence...
would assist "the objectives of the occupation." If the intrepid traveler met these criteria, they would have encountered numerous Japanese cities that still bore the scars of war. US military forces occupied most of the remaining hotels. Tokyo was off-limits. Army regulations even prohibited outsiders from purchasing Japanese food.2

Yet, during 1947, several Japanese and American travel firms were already planning for the resumption of tourism. Looking forward to restarting ocean liner service to Japan, the American President Lines had to contend with competition from commercial air carriers. The wartime operational experiences of Pan American (PAA) and Northwest (NWA), combined with improved aircraft technology, enabled them to enter the Japanese tourist market. Initially, General MacArthur permitted only two types of tours. PAA, NWA, and American President Lines offered American travelers one-week package tours, while the Japan Travel Bureau (JTB) sold one-day trips to Hakone and Kamakura for Americans docking in Yokohama. In 1949, Northwest Airlines still had to obtain MacArthur’s permission to fly groups of "air pilgrims" to Tokyo to celebrate the 400th anniversary of St. Francis Xavier’s arrival in Japan.3 The following year, the New York Times travel writer, Frederick Graham, asserted that faster aircraft, good flying weather, and "the unbelievable beauties of the Land of the Chrysanthemum" beckoned additional American tourists to Japan.4

Though Pan American officials focused more of their attention on promoting service to Latin America and Europe, they also sensed that there was great potential in Asia, especially Japan. Because of woefully inadequate western hotel facilities, Pan American began to consider building a large, modern Western-style hotel in Tokyo to encourage increased tourism. By 1949, Pan American started to receive offers from various groups looking to align with the airline to construct a hotel. Los Angeles architects, Walter Wurdeiman and Welton Becket, wrote Pan American Airways president Juan Trippe that they knew that the Japan Development Corporation—with strong connections with Prime Minister Yoshida—had just purchased a prime piece of real estate near the Imperial Palace. Company correspondence from this period suggests that Pan Am legal counsels were suspicious of these unsolicited schemes.5

Pan American and its subsidiary, International Hotel Corporation, were already diligently working on their own hotel project. They asked Major General Marquat, of the Economic and Scientific Section, if the Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) would approve a proposed 1,000-room hotel. General Marquat replied that it was likely due to the pressing need for economic rehabilitation. On July 12, 1949, Prime Minister Yoshida responded to PAA inquiries by noting that while he approved "in principle any projects which will bring new activities to Japan," he could not guarantee the hotel project, as it was ultimately the Japanese Diet’s (Parliament’s) decision.6

By the early 1950s, the creation of the Pacific Area Travel Association (PATA) and the signing of the US-Japan Peace Treaty began to affect transpacific tourism. In 1952, the PATA held its first conference when delegates from thirteen nations—including the US and Japan—met in Honolulu to develop plans to expand tourism in the "free areas" of the Pacific. The PATA Executive Committee, which included vice president of Pan American Airways, Clarence Young, and assistant vice-president of American President Lines, T. L. Eliot, supported measures to ease tourist travel such as eliminating "entry and exit visas.ipsis..."
By terminating the occupation in 1952 and restoring Japan’s sovereignty, the Peace Treaty helped pave the way for Japanese firms to play a much more important role in the tourist market. JTB, for example, opened overseas offices in major cities such as New York, and Japan Airlines began preparations to offer international air service.\footnote{7}

The Peace Treaty also led the US military to relinquish control of Tokyo’s Haneda Airport to Japanese civilians. This event garnered noteworthy coverage in the Japanese press. Numerous high-ranking American and Japanese officials attended the transfer ceremony. The Nippon Times—a key aviation booster—stressed that “once more Japan would be able to welcome proudly the airborne travelers of the world.”\footnote{8} The change was also more than psychological, as during the interwar era, Yokohama served as the main tourist gateway to Japan for steamship passengers. However, by the summer of 1952, Tokyo International Airport had already become the number one port of entry, handling 45 percent of all foreign visitors, while Yokohama fell to second with 36 percent. This marked an important shift in how travelers reached Japan.\footnote{9}

Pan American’s main competitor started marketing itself in the late 1940s as Northwest Orient Airlines, reflected the growing importance of Asia—especially Japan—to its business fortunes. Northwest worked with Japanese and American travel agencies to promote their transpacific business.\footnote{10} They also profited from newspaper coverage that portrayed the airline positively. In a 1951 Mainichi article, Northwest Airlines pilot, Russell Laboda, said that he started attending sumo matches between flights and found it so interesting that he commenced training with Japanese wrestlers.\footnote{11} In a 1952 Chicago Tribune article about his trip to Japan, Tom Hill began by observing that “as a boy […] Japan seemed as far away as the moon,” but now via the Northwest Airlines great circle route, he flew from Chicago to Tokyo in only twenty-eight hours.\footnote{12} Northwest promoted this route by including several Japan-related items such as pamphlets on Air Cruises to Japan and how to prepare for and what to expect in the “new” and “ancient” Japan in the Souvenir Flight Packet distributed to its passengers.\footnote{13}

Very few Japanese tourists visited the US in the early post-war years because occupation authorities did not permit any overseas travel until 1950. Additionally, the country’s post-war rebuilding efforts were time consuming. Equally important, the Japanese government allowed travel abroad only for “business, inspection, […] research” and athletic purposes,\footnote{14} thus, prohibiting leisure travel.

From 1954 to 1963, tourist traffic between the United States and Japan increased significantly. Many factors fostered this development including Japan Airlines initiating transpacific service, Pan American and Northwest developing marketing campaigns, and American and Japanese governments providing assistance. The introduction of jet airliners, and the expanding consumer culture in the United States also contributed to the growth.

By 1954, a major shift occurred. For the first time, airlines carried more passengers than steamships. This important event took place several years before the advent of jet airliners. Though most aviation historians associate the introduction of jets with the most significant changes in post-war commercial aviation, clearly, major advances were already occurring during the propeller era. The gap between air and sea tourists continued to widen throughout this period, and by 1962, air carriers transported three-quarters of all passengers between the US and Japan.\footnote{15}
Table 1. International Tourist Transportation to Japan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>By Airplane</th>
<th>By Boat</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>39,000 (48%)</td>
<td>39,000 (48%)</td>
<td>82,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>51,000 (52%)</td>
<td>48,000 (48%)</td>
<td>99,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>122,000 (67%)</td>
<td>60,000 (33%)</td>
<td>182,000 (first jet service began September)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>206,000 (74%)</td>
<td>74,000 (26%)</td>
<td>280,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


A second crucial development transpired in 1954 when Japan Airlines (JAL) began to offer international service. The Nippon Times carried front-page articles celebrating JAL’s inaugural flight to San Francisco. The airline ran numerous ads in the papers, proclaiming that they were the “Wings of the New Japan.” Speeches by ranking Japanese politicians and business leaders reflected the importance of the new service.16 JAL’s flights to America and its new motto, emblazoned on its airliners’ fuselages, signified not only Japan’s re-entry into international aviation, but also an early step in the reintegration of the country into the global community.

Pan American officials immediately responded to JAL’s entrance into the transpacific market. Beginning in February 1954, they placed ads in the Nippon Times that stressed their more frequent flights and greater experience.17 Until this time, Pan American’s only major transpacific competitor was Northwest Airlines. Now they began to closely monitor a new entrant. In an August 1954 memo to Vice President Adams, Systems Supervisor of Passenger Services, James Walker, pointed out that JAL had started providing baby cribs at the Wake Island fueling stop. This “most attractive service feature” demanded further study.18 In a confidential January 1955 letter to top PAA officials, Division of Traffic Sales Manager, H. F. Milley, noted that JAL had already “taken full advantage of the community of interest between Hawaii and Japan,” carrying so many “Oriental” passengers that they already hauled 40 percent of all Honolulu-Tokyo traffic.19 In another confidential memo six months later, Milley’s research showed that JAL also carried a larger share of westbound traffic to Japan for the seasonal Cherry Blossom festivals than Pan American. He provided a chart based on passengers’ racial characteristics to show that JAL was making significant inroads in carrying Caucasians, as well. He attributed this development to JAL’s large promotional campaign among travel agents in the US.20

Table 2. PAA Analysis of Characteristics of Travelers on JAL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>JAL Westbound: US-Japan</th>
<th>JAL Eastbound: Japan-US</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All 1954</td>
<td>Caucasian: 47%</td>
<td>Caucasian: 38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oriental: 53%</td>
<td>Oriental: 62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1955</td>
<td>Caucasian: 60%</td>
<td>Caucasian: 44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oriental: 40%</td>
<td>Oriental: 56%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: H. F. Milley, Division Traffic, Sales Manager, to SFO and NYC, confidential, 11 July 1955, B225, Folder 11, PAWA.
A comparison of Japan Airlines’ advertisements from this period of mounting competition reveals continuities and changes in their promotional strategies. The 1954 ads for their initial transpacific service in both the New York Times and Nippon Times emphasized that JAL used American crews, aircraft, and maintenance personnel, perhaps to assure English-speaking passengers, who might still be concerned about the “reliability” of a Japanese-operated airline less than a decade after war-related hostilities ended. This subject disappeared from later ads. The Nippon Times ad also stressed that JAL employed bilingual Japanese stewardesses. In contrast, copywriters for the New York Times ad tried to create the impression that as soon as the tourist boarded the airliner, they were already “in Japan.” This point was reinforced with an illustration of two Japanese stewardesses—one dressed in a traditional kimono—attending to a smiling Caucasian male. Five years later, a 1958 New York Times advertisement devoted even more text and a much larger illustration accentuating Japan Air Lines’ “lovely kimono-clad hostesses” pampering passengers. In a 1963 Japan Times ad, JAL continued to highlight the gracious “warm hospitality of your kimono-clad hostess.” However, unlike the earlier ad, JAL underscored the contrast: between the “old” and the “new” Nippon when asking their customers to enjoy “the calm beauty of Japan at almost the speed of sound.”

Pan American responded to JAL by introducing many innovative marketing policies aimed at the transpacific customer. In 1954, they promoted their “Fly Now...Pay Later!” credit plan. For only $69 down and twelve monthly installments, a middle-class tourist could afford a “dream trip” to Tokyo. The year after JAL began their transpacific service, PAA started employing twenty bilingual Nisei—second generation Japanese-American—stewardesses on their flights to Tokyo.

In Japan, some Pan American officials combined their knowledge and love of traditional Japanese culture with the airline’s goal to boost business. In 1953, for example, William Ortwin, Pan American’s District Traffic Sales Manager for Tokyo and a long-time sumo-wrestling fan, began presenting a huge silver trophy to the winner of each sumo tournament. Dressed in traditional hakama—long pleated trousers worn on ceremonial occasions—Ortwin’s presentations reached millions of people as his gesture coincided with the beginning of Japanese television’s sumo broadcasts. PAA continued its association with this ancient sport for many years, and later added support for the modern western game of basketball run by the Japan Basketball Association (JBA). Makoto Mihashi, JBA chair, asserted that Pan American’s “contributions to Japanese sports and culture [...] has made Pan American a favorite among the Japanese people.” These examples suggest that Pan Am focused more on financial incentives for Americans, while utilizing a cultural approach to entice Japanese clientele.

By early 1959, PAA carried 3,000 passengers across the Pacific each month in eighty-one passenger 350-mph Douglas DC-7 propeller-driven aircraft. In sharp contrast, during the entire Pan American Clipper Flying Boat era of 1935-1941, only 2,336 passengers journeyed aboard seven-passenger 135-mph China Clippers. PAA’s Transpacific Family Fare—introduced in January—significantly reduced ticket prices for wives and children accompanying their husbands. Less than eight months later, Pan American became the first carrier to offer transpacific jet service between Japan and the US. Jet airliners were so fast that a New York to Tokyo flight took approximately the same time as a New York
to Chicago train trip.\textsuperscript{25}

New technologies and cheaper fares cannot explain this entire phenomenon. In an expanding consumer society, one's image became increasingly important. Cognizant of this trend, Pan American hired a fashion travel consultant. In a March 1959 press release, Jane Kilbourne offered wardrobe and other travel advice for women flying to Tokyo. Because the weather would still be brisk in Japan, she recommended that ladies take “warmer woolens and cashmeres [which] are not a specialty of Japan.” She noted that good buys included silk dresses and jackets.\textsuperscript{26} Frank Agui, manager of the Foreign Department of the Japan Tourist Association, confirmed the importance of consumer values in a 1961 \textit{Japan Times} article. He observed that it was becoming “more and more fashionable with the American people” to travel to the Far East. He claimed that a considerable number of Japan-bound tourists had already been to Europe and so, they sought out new scenes.\textsuperscript{27} Impressing their middle class friends by being the first on the block to fly to “exotic” Japan certainly enhanced one’s reputation in status-conscious America.\textsuperscript{28}

Both the Japanese and US governments became more active in promoting travel between their countries. In 1959, the Japan Tourist Association (JTA), partially subsidized by the Ministry of Transportation, began to foster leisure travel to Japan. Additional sightseers would also bring in more foreign currency to help rebuild the country. Reflecting the importance of the American market, half the JTA overseas offices were located in the US. In 1962, the recently formed United States Travel Service (USTS) opened its first office in Tokyo to encourage visiting America. Capitalizing on this development, Northwest Orient Airlines ran ads offering congratulations, while publicizing their shorter Polar Route to the United States.\textsuperscript{29}

Yet, several challenges confronted travel promoters. Insufficient western-style hotel rooms continued to hinder leisure travel to Japan. A related issue, according to \textit{New York Times} columnist, Paul Friedlander, was western-style plumbing—i.e., toilets—a very important factor for “tourists whose spirit of adventure stops short of the Japanese approach to such matters.”\textsuperscript{30}

Several other factors inhibited Japanese citizens from flying to America. Their government still maintained severe travel restrictions. Additionally, most Japanese had less discretionary income at this time, compared to Americans. In 1961, 25,000 Japanese visited the US. While most were officially engaged in business activity, many took advantage of their situation to do some sightseeing.\textsuperscript{31}

From 1964 to 1977, more major changes occurred in US-Japanese tourism. The most important developments included the Japanese government lifting restrictions on tourist travel, the rapid emergence of Micronesia and Hawaii as major vacation destinations, and the number of Japanese leisure travelers surpassing Americans. These factors led to the emergence of mass tourism during this period.

The \textit{Japan Times} carried extensive coverage of the Japanese government’s decision to officially permit overseas tourist travel starting April 1, 1964. They noted that Japan’s acceptance into the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1962 required that the government “liberalize trade and foreign exchange.”\textsuperscript{32} In an April 2, 1962, editorial, the \textit{Japan Times} strongly supported this development deeming it “a valuable adjunct to the all-around improvement of the nation.” Moreover, they urged the government not to
impose any new restrictions on Japanese going abroad. However, their fears of continued government interference derived from the efforts of certain officials who still worried that becoming an “Article 8 nation” under the IMF, would hurt Japan’s balance of payments deficit. Transportation Minister Kentaro Ayabe, urged Japanese tourists to fly only on JAL to conserve funds. The New York Times reported that the Finance Minister proposed a 20 percent tourist “exit tax.” The IMF and the Pacific Area Travel Association, among others, pressured the government to drop this idea. Initially, tourists could spend a maximum of $500 in foreign currency during one overseas trip per year. In 1969, the Finance Ministry raised the amount to $750. The following year they lifted it to $1,000.

Since the Japanese government announced their plans to eliminate travel restrictions in 1962, citizens who wanted to vacation overseas began saving in advance. Japanese banks and travel agencies established the “Save Now, Go Later” plan for foreign travel. In April 1964, the first “Save Now, Go Later” group of tourists left Japan on a Pan American flight to Hawaii. Masato Maruki of the Japan Travel Bureau, who led the group of twenty-three, noted they had put aside money for three years. This plan reflected the nature of consumer credit in Japan that was seen as promoting disciplined “consumer-savers.” In sharp contrast, the ubiquitous American “Fly Now, Pay Later” plans encouraged immediate gratification without necessarily having adequate assets.

The Hawaiian tourist industry also began advanced preparations for the expected increase of “travel-hungry Japanese” by building new and refurbishing old hotels, adding more Japanese delicacies, and requiring staff to learn the language. Some Hawaiian tour operators could not wait for the Japanese to arrive, as they complained that mainland Americans were “too rude [...] too demanding” and still regarded the Aloha State as “backward.” Hawaii quickly became the favorite American tourist destination for Japanese.

The opening of the World’s Fair in New York City in April 1964 also stimulated Japanese tourism to America. Northwest and Pan American published ads in the Japan Times promoting World’s Fair Holidays. NWA hyped the “Fastest Way to the Fair!” because their transpacific route was 2,000 miles shorter than their major competitor. Following Japan Air Lines’ lead, Northwest also provided Japanese-style service including oshibori—hot towels—to refresh their guests. PAA stressed that their passengers could take two different routes to the Fair; one allowing them a free stop-over in Hawaii. JAL, however, could not take direct advantage of World’s Fair traffic as the US did not permit them to serve New York City until 1966.

Simultaneously, more Americans traveled to Japan. The excitement of the October 1964 Tokyo Olympics had an immediate and long-term impact on tourism which furthered Japan’s reintegration into international society. The anticipation of huge foreign crowds led to frantic preparations, such as building new hotels and highways and studying foreign languages. The government expanded airport facilities and JAL added three additional flights each week between the US and Tokyo. Pan American touted itself as “The official airline of the US Olympic Team” in its ads, guaranteeing seats to the games almost to the last minute. Even though the Olympics did not attract as many tourists as the experts predicted, it helped set the foundation for later international spectacles in Japan such as Osaka’s Expo ’70 and the 1972 Winter Olympics in Sapporo. In each case,
the airlines played an integral role in promoting these extravaganzas.

By the late 1960s, Tokyo had become the Far East international airline route and conference center. In September 1969, the influential American Society of Travel Agents (ASTA) held their 39th Annual Convention in Tokyo. Japan Airlines ran a full page ad in the Japan Times special ASTA supplement that proclaimed Tokyo as “the hub of the fastest growing travel market in the world,” continued to promote “traditional Japanese hospitality” on their flights, and touted their status as the official airline for Expo ’70 in Osaka.41 John McInemey, editor of Travel Management Newsletter, proclaimed that the expanding airline network helped make the Pacific the “In Place.” Masaki Kodama noted that Americans comprised 47 percent of all tourists to Japan, with the Chinese a distant second with only 7 percent.42 Japan Times writer Gloria Yamaoka contended that Japan needed to work harder to attract Americans, as other Asian destinations were increasingly appealing. She advocated educational enrichment programs in the US to foster greater knowledge of Japanese culture which—she argued—would lead to more Americans traveling to Japan. Yamaoka also observed that people who made the long journey to Japan from the US did so because long distance “travel is an important status symbol” that conveys an “impression of affluence.”43 This point neatly encapsulated the essence of the consumerist values prevalent among Americans that were becoming noticeable among Japanese.

The most significant change in the geography of tourism in this period was the rapid rise of travel to Guam, Saipan, and other islands in the US-administered Trust Territory. From 1947 to 1962, few tourists visited the area due to security restrictions as the US Navy and Air Force had major bases on Guam and the CIA trained counter-insurgency forces on Saipan. In 1960, Pan American obtained a seven-year contract that provided twice weekly inter-island service. In 1962, the US Navy eliminated the security clearance required for Americans to visit Guam. Three years later, Guam Governor Manuel Flores Leon Guerrero flew to Tokyo to encourage Japanese businessmen to invest in the island. He also urged Japan Airlines to initiate service. Yet as late as 1967, New York Times South Pacific correspondent, Robert Trumbull, characterized Micronesia as an “offbeat” tourist location only for the “hardy traveler.”44 Several factors accelerated the transformation of the region. In 1967, the Trust Territory Government proposed increasing air routes “to spur commerce, employment and especially the tourist trade.”45 Pan American World Airways initiated direct service from Tokyo to Guam. They also submitted a proposal to renew their Trust Territory contract by forming a new airline—Micronesian Air—and establishing a chain of “Island Inns [...] to spur tourism.”46 Northwest and Continental airlines presented competing proposals. The US Department of the Interior—responsible for administering the area—chose Continental’s bid because, among other factors, they were the only carrier to offer jet service. Continental Airlines president, Robert Six, stated his airline would “market the territory as a tourist destination for Asians as well as Americans.” A decade later, Continental and Japan Airlines inaugurated direct flights from Tokyo to Saipan, enhancing convenience by eliminating the stopover in Guam.47

On July 13, 1969, the New York Times carried an article provocatively titled, “Japanese Invading Saipan Again.” While attracting readers by playing on old fears of Japanese aggression, the anonymous author attributed the tourist surge to several factors: Japanese royalty visiting the island, loyal citizens following in their footsteps, and more frequent
Pan American flights.48 Two weeks later, New York Times writer, Robert Trumbull, proclaimed in a similar attention-grabbing headline, “Guam is Again Invaded by the Japanese (Newlyweds).” Trumbull pointed out that while only 2,000 tourists visited Guam in 1962, six years later 18,000 came—ninety percent of them Japanese. In addition to the honeymooners, many older Japanese, who lost relatives on the island during the American invasion in 1944, arrived in tour groups to build shrines and offer prayers to soothe the souls of the departed.49 As PAA had predicted, battlefield tourism attracted more and more veterans and their relatives from both sides of the Pacific War to Micronesia. Beautiful beaches, sport fishing, golf courses, and duty free shopping also enticed tourists.50 By 1976, the second largest number of airline passengers flying from Japan to the US landed in Guam.51

The “Japanese invasion” was not limited to Saipan and Guam. In 1973, Time magazine also manipulated Americans’ memories of the Second World War when it proclaimed that “The Japanese Invade Hawaii.” Time noted that Japan Airlines’ introduction of package tours to the islands in 1970 played a key role in fostering expanded Japanese tourism to Hawaii. They stated that some local Hawaiians began to complain that the Japanese were “developing a ‘closed system’ in which their countrymen fly JAL, use Japanese-owned hotels, buses, shops and restaurants, and Japanese tour guides.” The Hawaiian state government, however, was also partially responsible for this development, as they spent more than $1 million at Expo ’70 to attract more Japanese business investment.52

In the same year, the New York Times published an article with a similarly menacing headline: “Japanese Tourists Swarm into Hawaii.” The Times article, however, added an additional concern about “the ugly Japanese” tourist in America replacing “the ugly American” in Asia.53 By this time, the Japanese government and press were becoming increasingly concerned with the emergence of this negative image. In the 1973 White Paper on Tourism, the government urged that advertisements and promotional activities should advance the “deepening of a correct understanding of Japan and the Japanese people.”54 The Japan Times concurred with the White Paper’s recommendation for more education of Japanese tourists before they flew overseas, asserting that “there is a need for Japanese tourists going abroad to comport themselves in a manner conducive to the promotion of international understanding.” They argued, however, that problematic behavior was a larger problem in Asia than in the “advanced countries of the West.”55 At least one western writer did not agree with this interpretation. In a remarkable 1973 New York Times article by General MacArthur’s Occupation-era personal interpreter, Faubion Bowers, Japanese tourists were portrayed as “bespectacled...sightseer[s] compulsively snapshooting,” imbued with “periodic spurts of...masochistic nationalism” who were the newest “race of big spenders” that “insist on touring in groups.”56

Japanese tourists appeared not to be deterred by such commentary. By the early 1970s, less than a decade after the government lifted restrictions on pleasure travel, more Japanese journeyed to the US than Americans visited Japan, reversing the prevailing order of the previous quarter century.57 This trend continued, as Pan American, Northwest, and Japan Airlines carried almost 1.5 million Japanese tourists to the US in 1976. Hawaii and Guam were the most popular destinations, followed by San Francisco, Los Angeles, New York City, and Seattle.58
Table 3. Air Travelers from Japan to the US

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Japan-US</th>
<th>Passengers Carried:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Top 6 destinations</td>
<td>US Carriers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-Honolulu</td>
<td>291,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-Guam</td>
<td>95,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-San Francisco</td>
<td>89,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-Los Angeles</td>
<td>70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-Seattle</td>
<td>54,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-New York City</td>
<td>41,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total all Japan-US</td>
<td>686,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: “US Estimate,” 5 October 1976, PAWA

Most Japanese preferred group tours for their lower prices and bilingual guides who surmounted the language barrier. Tour groups frequently visited several locations, one popular nine-day excursion stopping at Honolulu, San Francisco, LA, Las Vegas, and the Grand Canyon. The devaluation of the dollar, greater discretionary income, and the draw of American culture—especially Mickey Mouse and westerns—also fostered expanded Japanese tourism.

By this time, however, several new challenges confronted transpacific tourist advocates. The Pacific Area Travel Association began to grapple with the environmental consequences of mass tourism. For example, how could they continue to support increasing travel to the Pacific while preserving native cultures? Beginning in 1970, Boeing 747 jumbo jets disgorged hordes of tourists whose presence increasingly overwhelmed Pacific island communities, fostered pollution, and undermined traditional ways of life. Worried about the impact of this “people pollution,” the PATA met in Kyoto, Japan, in 1973 to search for solutions. Moreover, the economic consequences of becoming much too dependent on the tourist industry also began to concern Pacific islanders.

Perhaps most importantly, the 1973-1974 surge in oil prices profoundly affected the US and Japanese economies.

Between 1947 and 1977, major changes occurred in the nature of transpacific tourism. When compared with the prewar era, the transformation is even more pronounced. In 1932, approximately 6,000 Americans traveled to Japan aboard ships. By 1958 most of the 52,000 Americans who reached Japan flew on propeller-driven aircrafts. Eight years later, almost 223,000 Americans arrived in Japan. The upsurge from Japan to America was even more noticeable. Clearly, the airlines played a key role in this process, enabling many middle class citizens, in both nations, to enjoy exotic overseas vacations which were once reserved for the elite traveling aboard steamships. The air carriers, however, did not operate in a vacuum. The state's influence became even more significant, frequently playing a key role in determining which destinations were accessible. Tourist-related organizations, such as the Pacific Area Travel Association, also shaped this development. Finally, the expanding mass consumer society—first in the US and later in Japan—
established a mindset and a value system that encouraged people to exhibit their affluence and good taste by consuming package and special interest tours offered by the airlines and their business partners.

NOTES


5. Walter Wurden and Welton Becket, AIA, Los Angeles, to Mr. Trippe, 7 July 1949, B319, Folder 1, Pan American World Airways, Inc. Records, Special Collections, University of Miami Libraries, Coral Gables, Florida [hereafter cited as PAWA].

6. GHQ, SCAP, Economic and Scientific Section, APO 55, “Proposed Erection and Operation of Hotel in Tokyo” to International Hotel Corporation, c/o Pan American World Airways, 11 July 1949, B319, Folder 1, PAWA; Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida to H. M. Bixby, Pan American Airways, 12 July 1949, B319, Folder 1, PAWA.


15. “International Travel Transportation [to Japan],” in Sorifu (General Administrative Agency of the Cabinet), Kanko Hakusho (White Paper on Tourism), Okurasho Insatsu Kyoku (Finance Ministry Printing Office, 1964), 35. The author wishes to thank Derek Wessman for translation of the White Papers on Tourism.


18. James W. Walker, Jr., Systems Supervisor, Passenger Service, to Vice President Adams, 27 August 1954, B225, Folder 11, PAWA.

19. H. F. Milley, Division Traffic, Sales Manager, to See Distribution Below (list of top PAA officials), confidential, 1 January 1955, B225, Folder 11, PAWA.

20. H. F. Milley, Division Traffic, Sales Manager, to SFO and NYC, confidential, 11 July 1955, B225, Folder 11, PAWA.


22. Progress Report 1954 Pacific-Alaska Division, Office Services Department, San Francisco, B203, Folder 8, PAWA; Annual Progress Report 1955 Pacific-Alaska Division, Pan American World Airways, Our Twentieth Year of Progress, B203, Folder 8, PAWA; Pan Am Progress Report, Pacific-Alaska Division, 1956, B203, Folder 8, PAWA.


28. For contemporary studies that analyzed this development see, David Riesman, The


32. “Government Plans Drive to Boost Exports,” Japan Times, 1 April 1964, 1.

33. “IMF Article 8 Status,” editorial, Japan Times, 2 April 1964, 12.


38. Chapin, “D-Day.”

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