THE TRIUMPH OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT: CONTESTING CORPORATE MOTHERHOOD AND THE CORPORATE WELFARE SYSTEM

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ABSTRACT

Turn-of-the-century advocates of corporate welfare work promoted a familial model of labor relations which opened the doors of labor management to women. Scientific management experts argued instead for personnel management based on a consumer marketplace model. Scientific managers gained the upper hand during World War I. Their success depended, in part, on defining women as unfit for executive positions in labor relations, thereby closing the doors of labor management to women. This regendering masked an equally significant abandonment of the welfare system's contention that companies bore an inherent responsibility for the general welfare of their workers.

In 1894 John Patterson, president of the National Cash Register Company, was brought face to face with the kind of labor problems that were confounding fellow businessmen across the country. English agents returned a $50,000 shipment of NCR registers for faulty workmanship. This costly disaster led Patterson to reconsider his labor practices, practices that had fostered a disgruntled workforce with little interest in turning out quality machines.

In typical fashion Patterson turned his prodigious energy to solving his labor problems. In a show of solidarity with his workers he temporarily moved his office back to the factory floor. He wanted to “discover what the troubles were by living with them.” Patterson later recounted the workmen's complaints: the factory was dark, dirty and cold, workers had no clean water for washing up, only a privileged few had lockers, and so on. He came away from these encounters determined that he “simply had to make that place decent to work in or go out of business.”

Patterson arranged for the factory floor to be kept clean, installed lockers, and supplied his employees with clean water. As it constructed new buildings, NCR pioneered factory designs with more window space to permit better lighting. In 1897 Patterson hired a local home missionary, Lena Harvey, to direct a multitude of new activities for NCR employees and their families - boys and girls clubs, a women’s club, music clubs, garden contests, home visiting, factory beautification, a company library and rest rooms. Although other company officials questioned the cost of these innovations, Patterson was confident that such welfare work was the key to creating an ideal class of workers - “enthusiastic, loyal and intelligent.” In the ensuing years, the NCR welfare program became even more elaborate, including the building of Welfare Hall,
which housed dining and meeting facilities for company employees, and the NCR Schoolhouse, at which employees could enjoy movies, listen to company-sponsored lectures, and attend regular company meetings. By Patterson's account his workers responded cautiously at first, but soon became enthusiastic about the new company policies.

Despite his optimism, NCR's employees were not content. By 1899 Patterson had signed contracts with over twenty unions. Notwithstanding his apparent generosity, NCR employees struck in 1901, angered at a dictatorial foreman and, apparently, at the welfare program as well. Patterson granted the foreman a "long vacation" to find other work.³

The offending foreman and strike leaders were not the only ones to lose their jobs. When the factory reopened Lena Harvey, NCR's welfare manager, was not invited back. Yet welfare work did not stop at NCR. In fact, over the succeeding years Patterson employed a series of welfare workers and greatly expanded the company's welfare program. Welfare Hall and the NCR Schoolhouse, for example, were both constructed after the 1901 strike.

The greatest change seems to have been the context within which welfare work proceeded. Shortly after the end of the strike and Harvey's firing, Patterson created the nation's first personnel department. He chose a former plant superintendent, Charles Carpenter, to direct the new Labor Department. Under Carpenter's guidance the Labor Department instituted systematic policies for hiring, promotions and firing. Welfare work was folded into the responsibilities of Carpenter's Labor Department.

In this shift from Lena Harvey's Welfare Department to Charles Carpenter's Labor Department, the National Cash Register Company pursued in quick-time what other companies would do at a slower pace. Thousands of American firms instituted welfare programs between the Great Depression of the 1890s and the First World War. Between the World War and the Great Depression of the 1930s most of those firms, like NCR earlier, abandoned the welfare system and embraced personnel management. The adoption first of welfare work, and then of personnel management, marked a crucial step in the development of the modern corporation - it signified the assumption of labor relations as an integral facet of business management.

Historians have given little attention to differences between the welfare system and personnel management. Yet, this transition reveals the fluidity of those early years. It was a fluidity in which large companies used labor relations policies to experiment with their place in American society. Large business enterprises were relatively new, and as the 19th century drew to a close they faced increasing challenges to their growing power. Workers resisted the intense pace and routinization of work; they joined forces to openly contest employers' dictation of inadequate wages and long work hours. At the same time, muckraking journalists, civic reformers and politicians attacked business from the outside, blaming the new corporate giants for a plethora of social problems and calling for state intervention to curb excessive business power. One progressive reformer summed up the situation:

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The alert and intelligent member of the capitalist group is aware of the fact that he and his class are under surveillance today; that they are distrusted by many of the people, and that the situation demands, not an arrogant defiance of this irrational attitude, but an earnest effort to justify their place in the social organism.4

Employers turned to the welfare system, in part, to do just this, to justify their place and their power.5 American businessmen asserted that such power was justified because their companies were responsible public citizens. They pointed to welfare work as the proof. Specifically, through welfare work large corporations assumed an obligation to care for their employees thus becoming, they claimed, part of the solution to the era's social problems. When employers rejected the welfare system in favor of personnel management after World War I, they released themselves from that social obligation. Employers released themselves from that obligation, however, without giving up the power they had claimed in return. This change was not obvious at the time, nor has it received much attention since because it was subsumed within a debate that critiqued the welfare system as feminine, and thus, unbusiness-like. Advocates of personnel management counterposed their manly expertise to the feminine characteristics of welfare managers. Pursued in these gendered terms, the relationship between corporate power and social obligation received little attention.

Before detailing the struggle that led to the triumph of personnel management, I will briefly outline what I see as the crucial difference between these two systems. The corporate welfare system, or welfare capitalism, represented employers' first, systematic effort to solve the labor problems of modern industrial enterprises. Large companies grappling with the problems of managing workforces in the hundreds and thousands were the most likely to establish welfare programs.6 These businessmen sought a labor relations policy that would solve their labor problems and legitimize the vast powers they and their companies exercised in modern America. They embraced the corporate welfare system because it promised to fulfill both these agendas. Welfare advocates argued that labor problems could be solved by transforming labor-management conflict into a mutually beneficial partnership. Attendees at a 1902 Employers and Employees Conference explained the goals of the welfare partnership. Their aim was to find "some plan by which the industrial forces of the country may be thoroughly harmonized, the work of the country may be carried forward in the spirit of peace, and our whole people may advance."7 Welfare employers would achieve this end by creating a labor-management relationship in which they and their employees bore mutual obligations and enjoyed mutual benefits. A Pennsylvania manufacturer expressed this idea of partnership when he explained that his firm had "made every endeavor to co-operate with our employes [sic], for the mutual benefit of themselves and ourselves, and we have had no occasion to regret our actions."8

Yet, employers like the Pennsylvania manufacturer did not adopt the idea of partnership indiscriminately. They had no intention of instituting partnerships similar to those they shared with business associates. Progressive businessmen sought a form of
partnership which responded to their desire for intimacy and cooperation with their workers, while ensuring that they maintained supreme power. No model of such a partnership existed in the business world. Thus, employers and their welfare managers had to look elsewhere.

They chose a model of partnership from the private world—the Victorian family. The late 19th century Victorian family was both esteemed and, at least in its most idealized form, seemed to offer the desired combination of harmony and hierarchy. The head of the household, the father, clearly held the reins of power. All family members submitted to his will, knowing that he acted for the mutual good of all. Welfare advocates asserted that the modern corporation, like a family, would ensure the welfare of all members of the corporate household. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, which assumed a familial role with both employees and policyholders, incorporated this role into its public persona, referring to itself as “Mother Met.” In a phrase that he would repeat often, President Haley Fiske told a convention of salesmen in 1916 “We are a family.” Bancroft and Sons’ Welfare Manager, Elizabeth Briscoe, writing of the illness of two employees and the need to send a third away for convalescence, noted that “in other respects our family are all well.” Laura Ray, Welfare Secretary at Greenhut-Seigel Department Store similarly assumed a familial relationship between employees and the company. She proudly reported that store clerks rarely applied to charity organizations “because we take care of our vast family as far as we can.” Laura Ray offered examples of this familial care to a class of aspiring welfare workers; she and her staff of nurses provided not only medical care, but also assumed familial responsibilities to “teach cleanliness as well as godliness” when they visited sick workers in their homes.9

As welfare advocates reconceived the modern corporation in familial terms they cast employers as corporate fathers and employees as corporate children. Like the Victorian family on which it was modeled, this surrogate family required a third party, a mother, to bring harmony to the corporate household. Welfare advocates emphasized the active role of welfare managers, the corporate mothers, in forging the desired partnership. At H.J. Heinz employees addressed the welfare manager as “Mother Dunn.” When asked why she was called Mother Dunn, a company officer replied: “[I]t’s the one word which fully explains her.... She is a mother, as much so to the girls in her charge as she is to her own son.” He noted that she “handles all those girls under her as if they were her very own daughters.” Mother Dunn “worried” with her girls, visited them in their homes, and in a single month attended twenty of their weddings.10 Welfare managers assumed responsibility for raising the corporate children (the employees) to fulfill their responsibilities within the business partnership. In essence, this meant teaching them the habits and values of the Victorian work ethic; welfare managers designed the vast array of welfare activities, like those at NCR, to inculcate the work ethic in their employees.

It seemed natural, then, for employers to favor women for these positions. Sharing a widespread belief that men and women were inherently different, they assumed that
women naturally possessed the nurturing skills which they, as men, lacked. Isabella Nye, welfare manager at a New York department store, included the following feminine qualities on a list of the requirements for a good welfare manager: compassion, tact, patience and the ability to inspire and encourage. Other welfare advocates emphasized the value of sympathy, love, delicacy, morality, honesty and perseverance. The welfare worker needed these qualities to gain the trust and friendship of her charges and to induce them to participate in the many uplifting activities she planned. Welfare advocates believed that these qualities, in combination with a certain domestic sensibility, helped managers select just the right mix of welfare features that would transform their workers into hard working, loyal and disciplined business partners. Thus, the welfare manager, as corporate mother, played a crucial role in the welfare system.

Advocates of personnel management, who gained the upper hand after World War I, rejected this familial model. Their rejection of the familial model reflected opposition to the welfare strategy, not a different assessment of the problems confronting American employers and workers. Similar to welfare advocates, personnel management reformers promised solutions to the ongoing problems of inefficiency, low productivity, high turnover, dictatorial foremen, and violent conflicts between workers and bosses.

In place of the family ideal, they recast the labor-management relationship in terms of the modern marketplace. Rather than trying to reform workers, personnel managers argued that companies should hire workmen and women who were already imbued with the desired work ethic - who were hard working, self-disciplined, cooperative and loyal. Personnel management would accomplish this by centralizing employment procedures, systematically screening applicants (using employment forms, skills and psychological tests and medical exams), by maintaining training, transfer and promotion programs, and through extensive record keeping. One text advised its readers that the employment department was analogous to the purchasing department.

Indeed, the actual routine of the two departments has much in common: the requisition, the securing of the materials according to specification and the change when the material secured does not live up to specification.

While the new system of personnel management promised to transform the employer into a discriminating consumer of labor, it also presumed that working men and women were discriminating sellers of that labor. If employers wanted to attract and hold the best labor, they would need to prove themselves worthy. Cyrus Ching, an early pioneer of the new approach, advised:

[management should deal with its employees in the same manner it deals with people in selling a product.... In labor relations it is so necessary to keep the employees sold.]
Another advocate of this new approach wrote: “It pays to serve the customer well; he comes back. It pays to serve the employee well; he stays.”

Welfare work was to be the employers’ stock in trade. Accordingly, one text advised that

[s]elling the personnel department to the prospective employees really amounts to selling the benefits of the entire organization...training, bonuses, working conditions, restaurants, athletic teams, dancing, housing and the like are all selling points.

Students in the nation’s first course on employment management, held during World War I at the University of Rochester, spent two of their first three days learning about suggestion systems, athletic and social activities and plant safety. When Robert Clothier, employment manager at Curtis Publishing Company and later a labor relations consultant, divided the field of personnel management into four divisions, two of the four covered traditional welfare work. Like the University of Rochester courses and Clothier, educators and practitioners who wrote on the subject always included welfare work among the four or five main divisions of personnel management. Significantly, personnel management did not entail a rejection of welfare work, only a rejection of the familial ideal that underlay the welfare system.

Despite this common interest in welfare work, advocates of personnel management had a difficult time selling their system to American businessmen. Although Patterson introduced some of these employment practices when he established the NCR Labor Department in 1903, virtually no one followed the NCR lead. In fact, the principles of personnel management began to take formal shape only around 1910, as reformers in the vocational guidance, industrial education and systematic management movements began sharing their ideas. Meeting under the roof of the Taylor Society these reformers began expounding the benefits (both in terms of productivity and labor peace) which would result from stabilizing production, systematically hiring, training and promoting employees, and from offering non-wage incentives.

Yet, most employers, whether they had established welfare programs or not, showed little enthusiasm for personnel management. The tide turned, however, by the end of World War I. A number of factors made employers more amenable to personnel management at this time. By the second decade of the century ideals of efficiency, rationality and systematization infused American society, particularly the business community, to a much greater extent than they had in the late 1890s and early 1900s when employers turned to welfare partnership. At the same time, business management changed during the late 1910s and the 1920s. A new generation of college-trained business managers replaced the entrepreneurial owner-managers who had built the nation’s large corporations. Welfare work had attracted those pioneering entrepreneurs because it promised to recapture the lost intimacy between employer and employees that they recalled from their early years in business. The new professional business managers had no such nostalgic memories, and in an era enamored with ideas of efficiency and
rationality they had no reason to seek that mythological past. The American workforce was also changing by the 1920s. The combination of aggressive Americanization campaigns and prohibitions against immigration transformed the labor force. Increasingly, second- and even third-generation workers replaced the foreign-born and first generation workers who had been the targets of welfare work. It became more difficult to pretend that working men and women were immature children in need of familial guidance. Advocacy of the welfare system virtually disappeared by World War I as the National Civic Federation, the most prominent exponent of the welfare partnership, turned its energies away from business reform to conduct an aggressive anti-socialist campaign. Finally, the welfare system had not solved the labor problem.

While employers were open to considering new systems for managing labor relations, there is no reason to presume that personnel management was the inevitable place for them to turn. They had, after all, resisted welfare managers' efforts to introduce many of the employment procedures advocated by personnel managers (such as centralized hiring and firing, maintenance of employment records and limitations on the powers of foremen). It is my argument that government intervention during the World War played a crucial role in the shift to personnel management. Central to the triumph of personnel management was a redefinition of labor-management as a male preserve.

The War, which required complete mobilization of the country's economic resources, elevated labor relations to a national priority. The Army, the Labor Department, and various government boards hired hundreds of new staff to stave off industrial conflicts that might hinder war production. A significant minority of these people hailed from the Taylor Society. This opened the door for these advocates of personnel management, who had largely been shut out of corporate labor relations, to gain the government's stamp of approval for their agenda. Rather than speaking to each other or preaching to recalcitrant businessmen, they suddenly had the power to transform their ideas into national policy.

An important element of that national policy was the decision to require all war contractors to employ personnel managers. Originating in the Ordnance Department of the U.S. Army, this policy was designed to ensure that war contractors abided by Department standards, which required fair wages and decent working conditions. Taylor Society members working for the Ordnance Department decided that it was necessary to train a corps of personnel managers to implement these new standards. The War Industries Board assumed formal responsibility for establishing a training program, and a number of Taylor Society members were transferred from the Ordnance Department of the U.S. Army to the War Industries Board for this purpose. Among them was Boyd Fisher, who had organized a fledgling Employment Manager's Association in 1916. Fisher hoped to raise personnel management to professional status.

Fisher and his associates opened the first government-sponsored training program for personnel managers at the University of Rochester in the spring of 1918. The six
week course included lectures on “the formation of a personnel department, the hiring and assignment of workers, transfer and promotion, wage payment methods, shop discipline, turnover and welfare work.” Following the armistice Fisher was placed in charge of a new Federal Board for Vocational Education, which continued to train employment managers for another fourteen months. By the time that post-war de-mobilization led to the closure of the Federal Board for Vocational Education, the government had trained an additional 600 personnel managers.  

Government promotion of personnel management went far beyond training these hundreds of men and urging their employment in war-related production. Those who organized the Rochester school clearly understood that this was a golden opportunity to establish personnel management as an independent profession. Under Boyd Fisher’s leadership they purposefully affiliated the government training program with a nascent movement to create a national association of employment managers. A small number of regional associations had met twice in the previous two years. Both times there had been talk of creating a national organization. At Fisher’s urging, they rescheduled their 1918 meeting, originally planned for Cleveland, to coincide with the graduation ceremonies of the first Rochester class.

The resulting Employment Managers’ Conference, held in May 1918, lasted for three days. The conference opened with the graduation ceremony for the twenty-four men who had just completed the government course. On the final day conference chartered a new organization, the National Association of Employment Managers. Throughout the three day event a parade of speakers extolled both the economic value of personnel management and the professional qualities of this new occupation. Over a third of these were government representatives, virtually all of them hired for war-related service. The 600 delegates attending the convention (business executives, middle managers and government officials) could hardly have missed the message. Boyd Fisher told the delegates that the conference was a celebration of “governmental recognition of the professional status of the employment manager.”

The school’s organizers required that all students be sponsored by an employer, and that they have practical shopfloor experience. Neither corporate welfare work, nor activities with working people off the shopfloor (such as settlement work) satisfied their criteria. In response to queries, Fisher remarked “I don’t expect that many women will have as much experience as men.” He lamented that several “promising women” had not been able to enter the course because they “had a different kind of industrial training.”

More than a desire for experienced students lay behind the exclusion of women. Government courses to train personnel managers were already experimental, Fisher argued. It would be too radical a departure to admit women. Further, he did not want to “lower the standards of the course.” Fisher and his male associates felt certain that admitting women to this new profession would dilute the prestige and the authority of personnel managers. The men who took the first Rochester course averaged 35 years of age; two-thirds of them were married. “These are not boys; they are men,” Boyd Fisher announced at the graduation ceremonies. “All are practical experienced men.”
Inherent in the federal government’s war-time promotion of personnel management was the construction of personnel management as a profession for men only. If the graduates of Rochester, Harvard and the other government training courses were a model, personnel managers would be middle-aged men with business training and prior managerial experience.25

This development is particularly significant since the fledgling movement had not been exclusively male in the pre-war years. In fact, the associate director of the Rochester school was a woman, Mary Barnett Gilson. Gilson was a nationally respected personnel manager at Joseph Feiss and Company in Cleveland. Gilson’s appointment as associate director was no accident or tokenism. Her expertise and prestige lent credibility to the school and its promotion of personnel management. (Gilson’s efforts to open the training program to women met strong resistance from her male colleagues.)36

In addition to Gilson, some of the most respected personnel managers in the country were women (including Jane Williams of Plimpton Press and Dr. Millicent Pond of Scoville Manufacturing Company). Although they comprised a small minority, 26 of the 600 delegates to the 1918 Employment Managers’ Conference in Rochester were women with personnel or welfare responsibilities.27 Welfare managers, whether female or male, did not oppose personnel management. In fact, many had been agitating within their companies for the centralized and systematic employment practices that personnel management promoted.28

Nevertheless, those who promoted the professionalization of personnel management found it advantageous to draw sharp distinctions between their market-based system and the familial welfare system. This necessarily entailed rejection of women, whose presence in labor relations grew out of the familial nature of the welfare system. Thus, the exclusion of women continued as the personnel management movement grew in the immediate post-war years.

Readers of the dozen texts published on personnel management between 1916 and 1923 could hardly have missed the message that this was a man’s job.29 One text advised that centralizing labor relations had been most successful when—

recognized as of comparable importance with problems of production, finance or sales, and so placed in the hands of a mature executive of vice-president caliber.30

If personnel managers were to reform current business practices, noted another, they must be able to meet fellow executives “on a level.” “The proposition must be firmly grasped,” wrote another personnel advocate, “that handling employees is a serious business.... Only big men can handle matters like these.”31

Nor did the message differ at the various conferences held to unify this new movement. One speaker told the 1920 conference of employment managers that the responsibilities of the personnel manager are “the duties of a full-grown man, not to be bestowed upon a weakling or a clerk.”32 Such verbal statements were reinforced by the general absence of women from both the speaker’s platform and the topics discussed.
A heated exchange between Mary Gilson and Mark Jones, executive secretary of the Industrial Relations Association of America, reveals that this was not an unintended oversight. (In 1920 the National Employment Managers’ Association was renamed the Industrial Relations Association of America, IRAA.) While planning the 1920 convention, the IRAA’s Board of Directors decided that “it was only fair to allow the women a session by themselves, wherein they could discuss the things that were of most importance to themselves in industry.” Subsequently, Mark Jones invited Mary Gilson to chair a special section on the problems of women in industry. Gilson minced no words in declining the offer. She wrote:

For years I have strongly maintained the position that what affects men in industry also affects women and that there is entirely too much segregating of the problems concerning women...Why don’t you accept women as a perfectly natural and normal part of the industrial situation.

Gilson’s pointed criticism drew a caustic response from Jones, who replied that since Gilson was not interested in a special session devoted to women, the Board would “promptly forget about special provisions for ladies, with the result that no woman would appear on the agenda at all.” She finally persuaded the IRAA to place a woman on the agenda. However, they pointedly selected a woman who was not a personnel manager, Mary Van Kleeck. Her assigned topic, “The Future of Women in Industry,” signified the IRAA’s refusal to integrate women into their vision of personnel management; women would not appear on the agenda as professionals. The conference would address women only as employees, and then only as a special case, discussed in isolation from other aspects of labor management.

Although employers did not recognize personnel managers as independent professionals in the way that many had hoped, they did favor men over women for these positions. Men seemed to better match the profile of the business manager, especially as the personnel movement redefined labor relations as a masculine occupation. Men also had greater access to the new labor relations courses offered by university schools of business. Many of these departments refused to admit women in the early 1920s. Employers, who increasingly turned to colleges to recruit new management personnel in the 1920s, were drawing from a pool that was overwhelmingly male.

The experience of one woman, Anne Armstrong, suggests the difficulties women faced in this new environment. Armstrong first entered labor relations around 1915, when a Wall Street investment house turned down her application to sell bonds, and instead offered her a position in its newly created employment department. Having no experience in the field, she tried to enroll in a course on employment management. The school refused her application on the grounds that she was a woman. Despite this, Armstrong quickly gained on-the-job expertise in the new employment methods. Her skills gained the favor of company executives, who promoted her to director of the women’s division and gave her wide latitude to shape the firm’s general employment program, for men as well as women. Within a few years executives fired the man who
directed the employment department and doubled Armstrong's salary. However, they refused her application to become director of the department. It would be unseemly, they told her, to allow a woman to occupy such an important position.36

Advocates of personnel management attacked the welfare system by denigrating its feminine character. In her role as corporate mother the welfare worker symbolized that feminine character. Personnel management's success depended, in part, on defining women as unfit for executive positions in labor relations. As one personnel manager explained, labor management demanded experts skilled in the "manly art of handling men." This regendering of corporate labor relations policy during and after World War I ended the nascent welfare system. Welfare work lived on, not as a system to promote cooperative partnership, but as a collection of benefits designed to "sell" the corporation to discriminating employees. No dramatic change in benefits or managerial shake-up marked this shift from welfare work to personnel management. In fact, the seed planted during World War I did not transform labor relations overnight. Rather, individual firms, often with the encouragement of trade organizations and Chambers of Commerce, generally reshaped their labor policies on a piecemeal basis - renaming their welfare departments, elevating men to the directorship of those departments, introducing employment applications and tests, building employee files, creating wage and job schedules, and so on, over a period of months or years.

Despite individual variations these changes, taking place primarily in the decade following World War I, marked a significant transformation in labor relations policy. American businessmen no longer pretended that they could reform workers, they no longer pursued a cooperative welfare partnership, and they no longer tied themselves to the obligations that such a partnership entailed. Thus, while firms continued to offer a variety of welfare activities, they stopped claiming that business bore an inherent responsibility to care for employee welfare.

At the same time, the welfare portal, through which hundreds of women entered corporate management, slammed shut. These labor relations pioneers had entered business at a time when the new managerial bureaucracies were just taking shape. Like many new occupations at the turn of the century, labor relations was not yet sex-typed. For a quarter of a century the welfare system offered opportunity for reform-minded women to enter the ranks of business management, albeit at low rungs on the managerial ladder. The triumph of personnel management, inherently linked to arguments that labor relations was a "manly art," closed the doors to corporate management for women - to be opened again, ironically, through the portal of personnel management in the 1970s.

Notes

2. Ibid., 193.


6. Each firm chose from a vast array of activities and benefits, depending on how elaborate a program it wanted. These included safety and beautification projects ranging from new factory design to provisions for clean drinking water to landscaping to fire safety drills. Welfare programs also offered educational and recreational activities, such as sewing and cooking classes for women, company picnics and dances, baseball leagues and company orchestras. Employers added various financial benefits as well, which might include savings plans, bonus plans, stock ownership programs or pensions. Finally, welfare programs included a healthy dose of direct moral instruction. At the Heinz plant wall plaques offered one word homilies to the Victorian work ethic: “Integrity,” “Economy,” “Temperance,” “Perseverance.” Welfare managers, like Lena Harvey, followed such moralizing with personal counseling both at the workplace and during home visits.


8. The Enterprise Manufacturing Co. of Pennsylvania to National Civic Federation, April 18, 1901, Box 72, Welfare Department, National Civic Federation Collection, New York Public Library.


12. Significantly, the only labor problem identified by welfare advocates, but not by personnel management reformers, was loss of intimacy between employers and employees. Welfare advocates classified loss of intimacy among the causes of the other labor problems.


19. Taylor Society members Morris Cooke and Mary Van Kleeck wrote the Ordnance Department directive which established the right of employees to some form of collective bargaining, as well as requiring employers to provide fair wages and decent working conditions. Maurine Weiner Greenwald, Women, War and Work: The Impact of World War I on Women Workers in the United States (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980).

20. Fisher’s interest in personnel management grew out of his involvement in the vocational guidance movement. He was particularly interested in developing systems of internal promotion for employees, which he believed would reduce labor turnover. Jacoby, Employing Bureaucracy, Ch. 4.

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22. U.S., Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin 247, 8. The success of the movement which was organized at the Rochester convention is reflected in the dramatic growth of NAEM membership in the next few years. The 600 delegates at the 1918 convention grew to 2,000 in 1919, and rose to 5,000 in 1920. By that time the organization had established a journal, Personnel, and employment management associations were meeting in over 50 cities.

24. Ibid., 21.
25. The war-time draft of young men probably accentuated the maturity and experience of the men who enrolled in these courses.
26. Mary B. Gilson, What's Past is Prologue, 168.
27. U.S., Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin 247, 228-249. The fact that a number of welfare workers attended the conference may be a sign that they were interested in adapting their own work to this emerging field, and that their own efforts to systematize welfare work was fully compatible with the kind of systematization promoted by the advocates of personnel management.
33. Mark Jones to Mary Gilson, April 12, 1920; Gilson to Jones, April 19, 1920; Jones to Gilson, April 27, 1920, Folder: General Letters 1920-1929, Box 4, Mary B. Gilson Papers, Wellesley College Archives.
34. It was at this convention that L.C. Marshall claimed that the duties of the personnel manager called for a "full-grown man."
35. See Jacoby, Employing Bureaucracy, 180-186, for an account of employer strategies to control the liberal wing of this movement, which was most committed to professionalizing personnel management. In her 1940 memoir, Mary Gilson, who was in a position to know and had lost her own position in personnel management, lamented that only one or two women remained in the field by the mid-1920s.